Dangerous human-made interference with climate: a GISS modelE study by J. Hansen et al.
Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 2287–2312, 2007
www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2287/2007/
© Author(s) 2007. This work is licensed
under a Creative Commons License.
Atmospheric
Chemistry
and Physics
Dangerous human-made interference with climate: a GISS modelE
study
J. Hansen1,2, M. Sato2, R. Ruedy3, P. Kharecha2, A. Lacis1,4, R. Miller1,5, L. Nazarenko2, K. Lo3, G. A. Schmidt1,4,
G. Russell1, I. Aleinov2, S. Bauer2, E. Baum6, B. Cairns5, V. Canuto1, M. Chandler2, Y. Cheng3, A. Cohen6,
A. Del Genio1,4, G. Faluvegi2, E. Fleming7, A. Friend8, T. Hall1,5, C. Jackman7, J. Jonas2, M. Kelley8, N. Y. Kiang1,
D. Koch2,9, G. Labow7, J. Lerner2, S. Menon10, T. Novakov10, V. Oinas3, Ja. Perlwitz5, Ju. Perlwitz2, D. Rind1,4,
A. Romanou1,4, R. Schmunk3, D. Shindell1,4, P. Stone11, S. Sun1,11, D. Streets12, N. Tausnev3, D. Thresher4, N. Unger2,
M. Yao3, and S. Zhang2
1NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, New York, NY, USA
2Columbia University Earth Institute, New York, NY, USA
3Sigma Space Partners LLC, New York, NY, USA
4Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
5Department of Applied Physics and Applied Mathematics, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
6Clean Air Task Force, Boston, MA, USA
7NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, USA
8Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l’Environnement, Orme des Merisiers, Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France
9Department of Geology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
10Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, USA
11Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
12Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, USA
Received: 23 October 2006 – Published in Atmos. Chem. Phys. Discuss.: 5 December 2006
Revised: 29 March 2007 – Accepted: 15 April 2007 – Published: 7 May 2007
Abstract. We investigate the issue of “dangerous human-
madeinterferencewithclimate”usingsimulationswithGISS
modelE driven by measured or estimated forcings for 1880–
2003 and extended to 2100 for IPCC greenhouse gas scenar-
ios as well as the “alternative” scenario of Hansen and Sato
(2004). Identiﬁcation of “dangerous” effects is partly sub-
jective, but we ﬁnd evidence that added global warming of
more than 1◦C above the level in 2000 has effects that may be
highly disruptive. The alternative scenario, with peak added
forcing ∼1.5W/m2 in 2100, keeps further global warming
under 1◦C if climate sensitivity is ∼3◦C or less for dou-
bled CO2. The alternative scenario keeps mean regional sea-
sonal warming within 2σ (standard deviations) of 20th cen-
tury variability, but other scenarios yield regional changes of
5–10σ, i.e. mean conditions outside the range of local ex-
perience. We conclude that a CO2 level exceeding about
450ppm is “dangerous”, but reduction of non-CO2 forcings
can provide modest relief on the CO2 constraint. We dis-
cuss three speciﬁc sub-global topics: Arctic climate change,
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tropical storm intensiﬁcation, and ice sheet stability. We sug-
gest that Arctic climate change has been driven as much by
pollutants (O3, its precursor CH4, and soot) as by CO2, of-
fering hope that dual efforts to reduce pollutants and slow
CO2 growth could minimize Arctic change. Simulated re-
cent ocean warming in the region of Atlantic hurricane for-
mation is comparable to observations, suggesting that green-
house gases (GHGs) may have contributed to a trend toward
greater hurricane intensities. Increasing GHGs cause sig-
niﬁcant warming in our model in submarine regions of ice
shelves and shallow methane hydrates, raising concern about
the potential for accelerating sea level rise and future pos-
itive feedback from methane release. Growth of non-CO2
forcings has slowed in recent years, but CO2 emissions are
now surging well above the alternative scenario. Prompt ac-
tions to slow CO2 emissions and decrease non-CO2 forcings
are required to achieve the low forcing of the alternative sce-
nario.
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1 Introduction
The Earth’s atmospheric composition and surface properties
are being altered by human activities. Some of the alter-
ations are as large or larger than natural atmosphere and
surface changes, even compared with natural changes that
have occurred over hundreds of thousands of years. There
is concern that these human-made alterations could substan-
tially alter the Earth’s climate, which has led to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United
Nations, 1992) with the agreed objective “to achieve stabi-
lization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system.”
The Earth’s climate system has great thermal inertia, re-
quiring at least several decades to adjust to a change of cli-
mate forcing (Hansen et al., 1984). Anthropogenic physical
infrastructure giving rise to changes of atmospheric compo-
sition, such as power plants and transportation systems, also
has a time constant for change of several decades. Thus there
is a need to anticipate the nature of anthropogenic climate
change and deﬁne the level of change constituting danger-
ous interference with nature. Simulationswith global climate
models on the century time scale provide a tool for address-
ing that need. Climate models used for simulations of future
climate must be tested by means of simulations of past cli-
mate change.
We carry out climate simulations using GISS atmospheric
modelEdocumentedbySchmidtetal.(2006), hereaftermod-
elE (2006). Speciﬁcally, we attach the model III version of
atmospheric modelE to the computationally efﬁcient ocean
model of Russell et al. (1995). This coupled model and its
climate sensitivity have been documented by a large set of
simulations carried out to investigate the “efﬁcacy” of var-
ious climate forcings (Hansen et al., 2005a), hereafter Efﬁ-
cacy (2005). We use the same model III here for transient
climate simulations for 1880–2100, with a few simulations
extended to 2300.
We made calculations for each of ten individual climate
forcings for the period 1880–2003, as well as for all forcings
acting together. The simulations using all ten forcings were
extended into the future using scenarios of atmospheric com-
position deﬁned by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC, 2001) and two scenarios deﬁned by Hansen
and Sato (2004). The simulations for 1880–2003 with indi-
vidual forcings are described by Hansen et al. (2007a). Ex-
tensivediagnosticsandconvenientgraphicsforalloftheruns
are available at http://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelE/climsim/.
Diagnostics for extended runs with all forcings acting at
once are also available from the ofﬁcial IPCC repository
(http://www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/ipcc/about ipcc.php).
Section 2 deﬁnes the climate model and summarizes prin-
cipal known deﬁciencies. Section 3 deﬁnes time-dependent
climate forcings that we employ. Section 4 examines simu-
lated global temperature change and speciﬁc regional climate
change issues. Section 5 compares trends of actual climate
forcings and those in the scenarios. Section 6 summarizes
the relevance of our results to the basic question: is there still
time to avoid dangerous human interference with climate?
This ﬁnal section goes one step beyond the usual scientiﬁc
paper, as it aims to interpret results in terms of policy op-
tions and stimulate discussion of the role of scientists in the
climate debate.
2 Climate model
2.1 Atmospheric model
The atmospheric model employed here is the 20-layer ver-
sion of GISS modelE (2006) with 4◦×5◦ horizontal resolu-
tion. This resolution is coarse, but use of second-order mo-
ments for numerical differencing improves the effective reso-
lutionforthe transportoftracers. Themodel topisat0.1hPa.
Minimal drag is applied in the stratosphere, as needed for
numerical stability, without gravity wave modeling. Strato-
spheric zonal winds and temperature are generally realistic
(Fig. 17 in Efﬁcacy, 2005), but the polar lower stratosphere
is as much as 5–10◦C too cold in the winter and the model
produces sudden stratospheric warmings at only a quarter of
the observed frequency. Model capabilities and limitations
are described in Efﬁcacy (2005) and modelE (2006). Deﬁ-
ciencies are summarized below (Sect. 2.4).
2.2 Ocean representation
In this paper we use the dynamic ocean model of Russell et
al. (1995). One merit of this ocean model is its efﬁciency, as
itaddsnegligiblecomputationtimetothatfortheatmosphere
when the ocean horizontal resolution is the same as that for
the atmosphere, as is the case here. There are 13 ocean lay-
ers of geometrically increasing thickness, four of these in
the top 100m. The ocean model employs the KPP param-
eterization for vertical mixing (Large et al., 1994) and the
Gent-McWilliams parameterization for eddy-induced tracer
transports (Gent et al., 1995; Grifﬁes, 1998). The resulting
Russell et al. (1995) ocean model produces a realistic ther-
mohaline circulation (Sun and Bleck, 2006), but yields un-
realistically weak El Nino-like variability as a result of its
coarse resolution.
Interpretation of climate simulations and observed climate
changeisaidedbysimulationswiththeidenticalatmospheric
model attached to alternative ocean representations. We
make calculations with the same time-dependent 1880–2003
climate forcings of this paper and same atmospheric model
attached to: (1) ocean A, which uses observed sea surface
temperature (SST) and sea ice (SI) histories of Rayner et
al.(2003); (2)oceanB,theQ-ﬂuxocean(Hansenetal., 1984;
Russell et al., 1985), with speciﬁed horizontal ocean heat
transportsinferredfromtheoceanAcontrolrunanddiffusive
uptake of heat anomalies by the deep ocean; (3) ocean C, the
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dynamic ocean model of Russell et al. (1995); (4) ocean D,
the Bleck (2002) HYCOM ocean model. Results for ocean
A and B are included in Hansen et al. (2007a) and on our
(GISS) web site, results for ocean C are in this paper and our
web site, and results for ocean D will be presented elsewhere
and on our web site.
2.3 Model sensitivity
The model has sensitivity 2.7◦C for doubled CO2 when cou-
pled to the Q-ﬂux ocean (Efﬁcacy, 2005), but 2.9◦C when
coupled to the Russell et al. (1995) dynamical ocean. The
slightly higher sensitivity with ocean C became apparent
when the model run was extended to 1000 years, as the sea
ice contribution to climate change became more important
relative to other feedbacks as the high latitude ocean temper-
atures approached equilibrium. The 2.9◦C sensitivity corre-
sponds to ∼0.7◦C per W/m2. In the coupled model with the
Russell et al. (1995) ocean the response to a constant forcing
is such that 50% of the equilibrium response is achieved in
∼25 years, 75% in ∼150 years, and the equilibrium response
is approached only after several hundred years. Runs of 1000
years and longer are available on the GISS web site. The
model’s climate sensitivity of 2.7–2.9◦C for doubled CO2 is
well within the empirical range of 3±1◦C for doubled CO2
that has been inferred from paleoclimate and other obser-
vational evidence (Hansen et al., 1984, 1993; Hoffert and
Covey, 1992; Annan and Hargreaves, 2006).
2.4 Principal model deﬁciencies
ModelE (2006) compares the atmospheric model climatol-
ogy with observations. Model shortcomings include ∼25%
regional deﬁciency of summer stratus cloud cover off the
west coast of the continents with resulting excessive absorp-
tion of solar radiation by as much as 50W/m2, deﬁciency in
absorbed solar radiation and net radiation over other tropical
regions by typically 20W/m2, sea level pressure too high by
4–8hPa in the winter in the Arctic and 2–4hPa too low in
all seasons in the tropics, ∼20% deﬁciency of rainfall over
the Amazon basin, ∼25% deﬁciency in summer cloud cover
in the western United States and central Asia with a corre-
sponding ∼5◦C excessive summer warmth in these regions.
In addition to the inaccuracies in the simulated climatology,
another shortcoming of the atmospheric model for climate
change studies is the absence of a gravity wave representa-
tion, as noted above, which may affect the nature of interac-
tions between the troposphere and stratosphere. The strato-
spheric variability is less than observed, as shown by anal-
ysis of the present 20-layer 4◦×5◦ atmospheric model by
J. Perlwitz (personal communication). In a 50-year control
run Perlwitz ﬁnds that the interannual variability of seasonal
meantemperatureinthestratospheremaximizesintheregion
of the subpolar jet streams at realistic values, but the model
produces only six sudden stratospheric warmings (SSWs) in
50 years, compared with about one every two years in the
real world.
The coarse resolution Russell ocean model has realistic
overturning rates and inter-ocean transports (Sun and Bleck,
2006), but tropical SST has less east-west contrast than ob-
served and the model yields only slight El Nino-like vari-
ability (Fig. 17, Efﬁcacy, 2005). Also the Southern Ocean is
too well-mixed near Antarctica (Liu et al., 2003), deep wa-
ter production in the North Atlantic Ocean does not go deep
enough, and some deep-water formation occurs in the Sea
of Okhotsk region, probably because of unrealistically small
freshwater input there in the model III version of modelE.
Global sea ice cover is realistic, but this is achieved with too
much sea ice in the Northern Hemisphere and too little sea
ice in the Southern Hemisphere, and the seasonal cycle of sea
ice is too damped with too much ice remaining in the Arctic
summer, which may affect the nature and distribution of sea
ice climate feedbacks.
Despite these model limitations, in IPCC model inter-
comparisons the model used for the simulations reported
here, i.e. modelE with the Russell ocean, fares about as well
as the typical global model in the verisimilitude of its clima-
tology. Comparisons so far include the ocean’s thermohaline
circulation (Sun and Bleck, 2006), the ocean’s heat uptake
(Forest et al., 2006), the atmosphere’s annular variability and
response to forcings (Miller et al., 2006), and radiative forc-
ingcalculations(Collinsetal., 2006). TheabilityoftheGISS
model to match climatology, compared with other models,
varies from being better than average on some ﬁelds (radi-
ation quantities, upper tropospheric temperature) to poorer
than average on others (stationary wave activity, sea level
pressure).
3 Climate forcings
Climate forcings driving our simulated climate change dur-
ing 1880-2003 arise from changing well-mixed greenhouse
gases (GHGs), ozone (O3), stratospheric H2O from methane
(CH4) oxidation, tropospheric aerosols, speciﬁcally, sulfates,
nitrates, black carbon (BC) and organic carbon (OC), a pa-
rameterized indirect effect of aerosols on clouds, volcanic
aerosols, solar irradiance, soot effect on snow and ice albe-
dos, and land use changes. Global maps of each of these
forcings for 1880–2000 are provided in Efﬁcacy (2005).
Figure 1 shows the time dependence of the global mean
effectiveforcings. Changesinthequantitativevaluesofthese
forcings that occur with alternative forcing deﬁnitions, which
are small in most cases, are discussed in Efﬁcacy (2005) and
in conjunction with the transient simulations for 1880–2003
(Hansen et al., 2007a). The predominant forcings are due
to GHGs and aerosols, including the aerosol indirect effect.
Ozoneforcingissigniﬁcantonthecenturytimescale, andthe
moreuncertainsolarforcingmayalsobeimportant. Volcanic
effects are large on short time scales and temporal clustering
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Fig. 1. Effective global climate forcings (Fe) employed in our global climate simulations, relative to their values in 1880. Use of Fe avoids
exaggerating the importance of BC and O3 forcings.
of volcanoes contributes to decadal variability. Soot effect on
snow and ice albedos and land use change are small global
forcings, but can be large on regional scales. Efﬁcacy (2005),
this paper, and detailed simulations for 1880–2003 (Hansen
et al., 2007a) all use GHG forcings as deﬁned in Fig. 1.
GHG climate forcing, including O3 and CH4-derived
stratospheric H2O, is Fe ∼ 3W/m2. Our partly subjective es-
timate of uncertainty, including imprecision in gas amounts
and radiative transfer is ∼±15%, i.e. ±0.45W/m2. Compar-
isons with line-by-line radiation calculations (Collins et al.,
2006) suggest that the CO2, CH4 and N2O forcings in Model
III are accurate within several percent, but the CFC forc-
ing may be 30–40% too large. If that correction is needed,
it will reduce our estimated greenhouse gas forcing to Fe
∼2.9W/m2.
Stratospheric aerosol forcing following the 1991 Mount
Pinatubo volcanic eruption is probably accurate within 20%,
based on a strong constraint provided by satellite measure-
ments of planetary radiation budget (Wong et al., 2004),
as illustrated in Fig. 11 of Efﬁcacy (2005). The uncer-
tainty increases for earlier eruptions, reaching about ±50%
for Krakatau in 1883. Between large eruptions prior to
the satellite era, when small eruptions might escape detec-
tion, minimum stratospheric aerosol forcing uncertainty was
∼0.5W/m2.
Tropospheric aerosols are based on emissions estimates
andaerosoltransportmodeling, asdescribedbyKoch(2001).
Their indirect effect is a parameterization based on empiri-
cal effects of aerosols on cloud droplet number concentra-
tion (Menon and Del Genio, 2007) as described in Efﬁcacy
(2005). Aerosol forcings are deﬁned in detail by Hansen et
al.(2007a). ThenetdirectaerosolforcingisFe=−0.60W/m2
and the total aerosol forcing is Fe=−1.37W/m2 for 1880–
2003. Our largely subjective estimate of the uncertainty in
the net aerosol forcing is at least 50%.
The sum of all forcings is Fe∼1.90W/m2 for 1880–2003.
However, the net forcing is evaluated more accurately from
an ensemble of simulations carried out with all forcings
present at the same time (Efﬁcacy, 2005), thus account-
ing for any non-linearity in the combination of forcings
and minimizing the effect of noise (unforced variability) in
the climate model runs. All forcings acting together yield
Fe∼1.75W/m2.
Uncertainty in the net forcing for 1880–2003 is dominated
by the aerosol forcing uncertainty, which is at least 50%.
Given our estimates, we must conclude that the net forcing
is uncertain by ∼1W/m2. Therefore the smallest and largest
forcings within the range of uncertainty differ by more than a
factor of three, primarily because of the absence of accurate
measurements of aerosol direct and indirect forcings.
One implication of the uncertainty in the net 1880–2003
climateforcingisthatitisfruitlesstotrytoobtainanaccurate
empirical climate sensitivity from observed global tempera-
ture change of the past century. However, paleoclimate evi-
dence of climate change between periods with well-known
boundary conditions (forcings) provides a reasonably pre-
cise measure of climate sensitivity: 3±1◦C for doubled CO2
(Hansen et al., 1984, 1993; Hoffert and Covey, 1992). Thus
we conclude that our model sensitivity of 2.9◦C for doubled
CO2 is reasonable.
Figure 1b indicates that, except for occasional large vol-
canic eruptions, the GHG climate forcing has become the
dominant global climate forcing during the past few decades.
GHG dominance is a result of the slowing growth of anthro-
pogenic aerosols, as increased aerosol amounts in developing
countrieshavebeenatleastpartiallybalancedbydecreasesin
developed countries. This dominance of GHG forcing, with
a net forcing that may be approaching the equivalence of a
1% increase in solar irradiance, implies that global tempera-
ture change should now be rising above the level of natural
climate variability.
Furthermore, we can anticipate that the dominance of
GHG forcing over aerosol and other forcings will be all
the more true in the future (Andreae et al., 2005). There
is little expectation that developing countries will allow
aerosol amounts to continue to grow rapidly, as their aerosol
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pollution is already hazardous to human health and tech-
nologies to reduce emissions are available. If future GHG
amounts are anywhere near the projections in typical IPCC
scenarios, GHG climate forcings will be dominant in the fu-
ture. Thus, we suggest, it is possible to make meaningful
projections of future climate change despite uncertainties in
past aerosol forcings.
IPCC (2001) deﬁnes a broad range of scenarios for future
greenhouse gas amounts. This range is shown nominally by
the colored area in Fig. 2, which is bordered by the two IPCC
scenarios that give the largest and smallest greenhouse gas
amounts in 2100. We carry out climate simulations for three
IPCC scenarios: A2, A1B and B1. These simulations include
changes in well-mixed GHGs only, with short-lived species
held ﬁxed at their present values. A2 and B1 are, respec-
tively, near the maximum and minimum of the range of IPCC
(2001) scenarios, and A1B is known as the IPCC midrange
baseline scenario.
We also carry out simulations for the “alternative” and
“2◦C” scenarios (Fig. 2) deﬁned in Table 2 of Hansen and
Sato (2004). CO2 increases 75ppm during 2000–2050 in
the alternative scenario; CH4 decreases moderately, enough
to balance a steady increase of N2O; chloroﬂuorocarbons 11
and 12 decrease enough to balance the increase of all other
trace gases, an assumption that is handled by having all these
gases remain constant after 2000. CO2 peaks at 475ppm
in 2100 in the alternative scenario, while CH4 decreases to
1300ppb. The alternative scenario is designed to keep the
added forcing at about 1W/m2 in 2000–2050 and another
0.5W/m2 in 2050–2100. With a nominal climate sensitiv-
ity of 3/4
◦C per W/m2 and slowly declining greenhouse gas
amounts after 2100, this scenario prevents global warming
from exceeding 1◦C above the global temperature in 2000,
a level that Hansen (2004, 2005a, b) has argued would con-
stitute “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with global
climate.
O’Niell and Oppenheimer (2002) suggest 2◦C added
global warming as a limit deﬁning “dangerous anthropogenic
interference”. Thus we also made climate simulations for a
scenario expected to approach but not exceed that limit. The
“2◦C” scenario has CO2 peak at 560ppm in 2100 and other
greenhouse gases follow the IPCC midrange scenario A1B
(see http://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/ghgases/).
4 Climate simulations
Simulations for the historical period, 1880–2003, warrant
careful comparison with observations and analysis of effects
of individual forcings. Results are described in detail by
Hansen et al. (2007a) and model diagnostics are available at
http://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelE/climsim/. We brieﬂy sum-
marize results relevant to analysis of the level of future global
warming that might constitute dangerous climate interfer-
ence.
We emphasize temperature change. Temperature is well
measured, it is the variable used in deﬁning climate sensitiv-
ity, and our model’s climate sensitivity and capability to sim-
ulate observed temperature change are well-tested (Hansen
et al., 2007a). Temperature change is important in determin-
ing sea level change and movement of the zones in which
animal and plant species can survive (Hansen, 2006; Hansen
et al., 2006). Changes of the water cycle and climate ex-
tremes may be even more important to ecosystems, wildlife
and humans, and thus for determination of “dangerous” cli-
mate change. We assume that there are systematic changes
of the water cycle with global warming. The most impor-
tant water cycle changes with global warming are probably
intensiﬁcation of the pattern of precipitation minus evapora-
tion and its temporal variance (Held and Soden, 2006; Lu et
al. 2007). There is general agreement among a large num-
ber of models about the nature of these hydrologic changes
with global warming (ibid.), as well as paleoclimate evidence
supporting the sense of the changes, and thus we are able to
discuss expected water cycle changes with global warming
on the basis of temperature projections (Sect. 6.1.2).
The model driven by the forcings of Fig. 1 simulates
observed 1880–2003 global temperature change reasonably
well, as crudely apparent in Fig. 3a. An equally good ﬁt to
observations probably could be obtained from a model with
larger sensitivity (than 2.9◦C for doubled CO2) and smaller
net forcing, or a model with smaller sensitivity and larger
forcing, but paleoclimate evidence constrains climate sensi-
tivity, as mentioned above. Also our model responds realis-
tically to the known short-term forcing by Pinatubo volcanic
aerosols (Hansen et al., 2007a), and simulated global warm-
ing for the past few decades, when increasing greenhouse
gases were the dominant forcing (Fig. 1), is realistic (Hansen
et al., 2005b, 2007a).
The largest discrepancies in simulated 1880–2003 surface
temperature change are deﬁcient warming in Eurasia and
excessive warming of the tropical Paciﬁc Ocean. Hansen
et al. (2007a) present evidence that the deﬁcient Eurasian
warming may be due to an excessive anthropogenic aerosol
optical depth in that region. The lack of notable observed
warming in the tropical Paciﬁc could be due to increased fre-
quency or intensity of La Ninas (Cane et al., 1997), a char-
acteristic that our present model would not be able to capture
regardless of whether it was a forced or unforced change.
Overall, simulated climate change does not agree in all de-
tails with observations, but such agreement is not expected
given unforced climate variability, uncertainty in climate
forcings, and current model limitations. However, the cli-
mate model does a good job of simulating global tempera-
ture change from short time-scale (volcanic aerosol) to cen-
tury time-scale forcings. This provides incentive to exam-
ine model results for evidence of dangerous human-made cli-
mate effects and to investigate how these effects depend upon
alternative climate forcing scenarios.
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4.1 Global temperature change
We carry out climate simulations for the 21st century and
beyond for IPCC (2001) scenarios A2, A1B, and B1 and the
“alternative” and “2◦C” scenarios of Hansen et al. (2000) and
Hansen and Sato (2004). Simulations are continued beyond
2100withforcingsﬁxedat 2100levelsasrequestedbyIPCC,
although the alternative and 2◦C scenarios per se have a slow
decline of human-made forcings after 2100.
Figure 3a and Table 1 show the simulated global mean sur-
face air temperature change. The A2 and B1 simulations
are single runs, while A1B is a 5-member ensemble. A 5-
member ensemble of runs is carried out for the alternative
scenario including future volcanoes, the 2010–2100 volcanic
aerosols being identical to those of 1910–2000 in the updated
Sato et al. (1993) index. Single runs are made for the alter-
native and 2◦C scenarios without future volcanoes.
Global warming is 0.80◦C between 2000 and 2100 in the
alternative scenario (for the 25-year running mean at 2100; it
is 0.66◦C based on linear ﬁt) and 0.89◦C between 2000 and
2200 (0.77◦C based on linear ﬁt) with atmospheric compo-
sition ﬁxed after 2100. The Earth is out of energy balance
by ∼3/4W/m2 in 2100 (∼0.4W/m2 in 2200) in this scenario
(Fig. 3b), so global warming eventually would exceed 1◦C
if atmospheric composition remained ﬁxed indeﬁnitely. The
alternative scenario of Hansen and Sato (2004) has GHGs
decrease slowly after 2100, thus keeping warming <1◦C.
Global warming in all other scenarios already exceeds 1◦C
by 2100, ranging from 1.2◦C in scenario B1 to 2.7◦C in sce-
nario A2.
Note the slow decline of the planetary energy imbalance
after 2100 (Fig. 3b), which reﬂects the shape of the surface
temperature response to a climate forcing. Figure 4d in Ef-
ﬁcacy (2005) shows that 50% of the equilibrium response
is achieved within 25 years, but only 75% after 150 years,
and the ﬁnal 25% requires several centuries. This behavior
of the coupled model occurs because the deep ocean contin-
ues to take up heat for centuries. Veriﬁcation of this behav-
ior in the real world requires data on deep ocean tempera-
ture change. In the model, heat storage associated with this
long tail of the response curve occurs mainly in the South-
ern Ocean. Measured ocean heat storage in the past decade
(Willis et al., 2004; Lyman et al., 2006) presents limited ev-
idence of this phenomenon, but the record is too short and
the measurements too shallow for full conﬁrmation. Ongo-
ing simulations with modelE coupled to the current version
of the Bleck (2002) ocean model show less deep mixing of
heat anomalies.
Figure 3c compares the global distribution of 21st cen-
tury temperature change in the ﬁve scenarios. Warming in
the alternative scenario is <1◦C in most regions, reaching
1◦C only in the Arctic and a few continental regions. The
weakest IPCC forcing, B1, has almost twice the warming of
the alternative scenario, with more than 2◦C in the Arctic.
The strongest IPCC forcing, A2, yields four times the global
warming of the alternative scenario, with annual warming
exceeding 4◦C on large areas of land and in the Arctic. We
compare these warmings to observed change and interannual
variability in the next section.
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Fig. 3. Global mean surface air temperature for several scenarios calculated by our coupled climate model as extensions of the 1880–2003
simulations for “all forcings”. Forcings beyond 2003 for these scenarios are deﬁned in Fig. 2. Stratospheric aerosols in 2010–2100 are the
same as in 1910-2000 for the case including future volcanoes. Tropospheric aerosols are unchanging in the 21st century.
Table 1. Forcings and surface air temperature response to different forcings for several periods in the future.
Forcing agent Run name Fi Fa 1Ts (2000 to Year Below)
2000–2100 2050 2100 2200 2300
IPCC Scenarios
A2 E3IP A2 6.67 6.23 1.06 2.71 3.33 3.70
A1B E3IP A1B 4.72 4.36 1.04 1.99 2.51 2.75
B1 E3IP B1 2.61 2.38 0.73 1.20 1.36 1.54
GISS Scenarios
Alternative S. w/o Volcanoes E3ALT 1.59 1.44 0.50 0.80 0.89 –
Alternative S. with Volcanoes E3ALTV – – 0.53 0.56 – –
2◦C Scenario w/o Volcanoes E3 2Cx 3.08 2.85 0.81 1.46 1.66 –
Constant Scenario
2003 Forcings E3Af8xa 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.28 – –
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Fig. 4. (a) Observed seasonal (DJF and JJA) surface temperature change in the past century based on local linear trends and the standard
deviation about the local 100-year mean temperature, (b) simulated 21st century seasonal temperature change for ﬁve GHG scenarios and
the ratio of the simulated change to the observed 20th century standard deviation.
4.2 Regional climate change
Figure 4 compares climate change simulated for the present
century with climate change and climate variability that hu-
mans and the environment experienced in the past century.
Figure 4a is the observed change (based on linear trend) of
seasonal (winter and summer) surface temperature over the
past century and the local standard deviation, σ, of seasonal
mean temperature about its 100-year mean. The range within
which seasonal-mean temperature has varied in the past mil-
lennium is probably no more than twice the range shown in
Fig. 4a for the past century (Mann et al., 2003).
Figure 4b shows the simulated change of seasonal mean
temperature this century and the ratio of this change to ob-
served local temperature variability. Warming in the alterna-
tive scenario is typically 2σ or less, i.e. the average seasonal
mean temperature at the end of the 21st century will be at
a level that is occasionally experienced in today’s climate.
Warming in the 2◦C and IPCC B1 scenarios is typically 4σ.
Warming in the IPCC A2 and A1B scenarios, commonly
called “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenarios, is typically 5–
10σ. Note that due to poorly resolved ENSO variability, σ is
underestimated in the tropical Paciﬁc.
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Ecosystems, wildlife, and humans would be subjected in
the BAU scenarios to conditions far outside their local range
of experience. We suggest that 5–10σ changes of seasonal
temperature are prima facie evidence that the BAU scenar-
ios extend well into the range of “dangerous anthropogenic
interference”
Figure 4 provides a general perspective on the magnitude
of regional climate change expected for a given climate forc-
ing scenario. Additional perspective on the practical signiﬁ-
cance of regional climate change is obtained by considering
three speciﬁc cases: the Arctic, tropical storms originating in
the Tropical Atlantic Ocean, and the ocean in the vicinity of
ice shelves.
4.2.1 Arctic climate change
Recent warming in the Arctic is having notable effects on
regional ecology, wildlife, and indigenous peoples (ACIA,
2004). Unforced climate variability is especially large in the
Arctic (Fig. 4, top row), where modeled variability is simi-
lar in magnitude to observed variability (Fig. 11 in Hansen et
al., 2007a). Observed variability includes the effect of forc-
ings, but, at least in the model, forcings are not yet large
enough to have noticeable effect on the regional standard de-
viation about the long-term trend. Prior to recent warming,
the largest ﬂuctuation of Arctic temperature was the brief
strong Arctic warming around 1940, which Johannessen et
al. (2004) and Delworth and Knutson (2000) argue was an
unforced ﬂuctuation associated with the Arctic Oscillation
and a resulting positive anomaly of ocean heat inﬂow into
that region. Forcings such as solar variability (Lean and
Rind, 1998) or volcanoes (Overpeck et al., 1997) may con-
tribute to Arctic variability, but we do not expect details of
observed climate change in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century
to be matched by model simulations because of the large un-
forced variability. However, the magnitude of simulated Arc-
tic warming over the entire century (illustrated by Hansen et
al., 2007a) is consistent with observations. Given the attri-
bution of at least a large part of global warming to human-
made forcings (IPCC, 2001), high latitude ampliﬁcation of
warming in climate models and paleoclimate studies, and the
practical impacts of observed climate change (ACIA, 2004),
Arctic climate change warrants special attention.
Early energy balance climate models revealed a “small ice
cap instability” at the pole (Budyko, 1969; North, 1984),
which implied that, once sea ice retreated to a critical lati-
tude, all remaining ice would be lost rapidly without addi-
tional forcing. This instability disappears in climate mod-
els with a seasonal cycle of radiation and realistic dynam-
ical energy transports, but a vestige remains: the snow/ice
albedo feedback makes sea ice cover in summer and fall sen-
sitive to moderate increase of climate forcings. The Arctic
was ice-free in the warm season during the Middle Pliocene
when global temperature was only 2-3◦C warmer than today
(Crowley, 1996; Dowsett et al., 1996).
Satellite data indicate a rapid decline, ∼9%/decade, in
perennial Arctic sea ice since 1978 (Comiso, 2002), rais-
ing the question of whether the Arctic has reached a “tipping
point” leading inevitably to loss of all warm season sea ice
(Lindsay and Zhang, 2005). Indeed, some experts suggest
that “...there seem to be few, if any, processes or feedbacks
that are capable of altering the trajectory toward this ‘super
interglacial’ state” free of summer sea ice (Overpeck et al.,
2005).
Could the Greenland ice sheet survive if the Arctic were
ice-free in summer and fall? It has been argued that not only
is ice sheet survival unlikely, but its disintegration would be a
wet process that can proceed rapidly (Hansen, 2004, 2005a,
b). Thus an ice-free Arctic Ocean, because it may hasten
melting of Greenland, may have implications for global sea
level, as well as the regional environment, making Arctic cli-
mate change centrally relevant to deﬁnition of dangerous hu-
man interference.
Are there realistic scenarios that might avoid large Arc-
tic warming and an ice-free Arctic Ocean? Efﬁcacy (2005)
and Shindell et al. (2006) suggest that non-CO2 forcings are
the cause of a substantial portion of Arctic climate change,
and thus reduction of these pollutants would make stabiliza-
tion of Arctic climate more feasible. Investigation of this
topic should include simulations of future climate for plausi-
ble changes of forcings that affect the Arctic. Although that
is beyond the scope of our present paper, we can make infor-
mative comparisons of estimated warmings by greenhouse
gases and other pollutants.
Figure 5a and the top row of Fig. 5b show observed 1880–
2003 surface temperature change and our simulated tempera-
ture change for “all forcings”, in both cases the Arctic warm-
ing being about twice the global warming. The second row
of Fig. 5b shows the results of simulations including only the
CO2 forcing (left) and only CH4 plus tropospheric O3 (right).
CO2 and CH4+O3 yield comparable global and Arctic warm-
ings. The sum of the responses to CO2 and CH4+O3 exceeds
either observed warming or the simulated warming for “all
forcings”, because the real world and “all forcings” include
negative forcings, which are due primarily to aerosols.
The lower left of Fig. 5b shows the simulated temper-
ature change due to the effect of black carbon on snow
albedo. In this simulation, described in detail by Hansen et
al.(2007a), amoderatesnowalbedoforcing(∼0.05W/m2)is
assumed. The BC producing this snow albedo effect also has
direct and indirect aerosol forcings, and the sources produc-
ing BC also produce OC. The lower right of Fig. 5b shows
the simulated temperature change due to the combination of
CH4+O3+BC+OC,includingaerosoldirectandindirectforc-
ings and the snow albedo effect. The global warming is about
the same as that due to CH4+O3, as the warming by BC and
its snow albedo effect is not much larger than the cooling
by OC and the indirect effect of BC and OC. Nevertheless,
simulated Arctic warming is more than 1◦C with all of these
forcings present.
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Fig. 5. Surface temperature change based on local linear trends for observations and simulations. (a) is an orthographic projection of the top
two maps in (b). CH4 forcing includes its indirect effect on stratospheric H2O. Snow albedo effect has 1880–2003Fa ∼0.05W/m2. Results
in the bottom map of the third column include direct effects of black carbon (BC) and organic carbon (OC) aerosols from fossil fuels and
biomass, their aerosol indirect effects (AIE), and the snow albedo effect. (c) shows temperature change in the ﬁrst half of the 21st century
for IPCC BAU and alternative scenarios.
Figure 5c shows that if CO2 growth in the 21st century is
kept as small as in the alternative scenario, additional Arc-
tic warming by 2050 is about the same as warming to date
by non-CO2 forcings. Thus, in that case, reduction of some
of the pollutants considered in Fig. 5 may make it possible
to keep further Arctic warming very small and thus probably
avoid loss of all sea ice. On the other hand, if CO2 growth
follows a BAU scenario, the impact of reducing the non-CO2
forcings will be small by comparison and probably inconse-
quential.
We suggest that the conclusion that a “tipping point” has
been passed, such that it is not possible to avoid a warm-
season ice-free Arctic, with all that might entail for regional
climate and the Greenland ice sheet, is not warranted yet.
Better information is needed on the present magnitude of all
anthropogenic forcings and on the potential for their reduc-
tion. If CO2 growth is kept close to that of the alternative
scenario, and if strong efforts are made to reduce positive
non-CO2 forcings, it may be possible to minimize further
Arctic climate change.
4.2.2 Tropical climate change
ThetropicalAtlanticOceanisthespawninggroundsfortrop-
ical storms and hurricanes that strike the United States and
Caribbean nations. Many local and large-scale factors affect
storm activity and there are substantial correlations of storm
occurrence and severity with external conditions such as the
Southern Oscillation and Quasi-Biennial Oscillation (Gray,
1984; Emanuel, 1987; Henderson-Sellers et al., 1998; Gold-
enberg, et al., 2001; Trenberth, 2005; Trenberth and Shea,
2006). Two factors especially important for Atlantic hur-
ricane activity are SST at 10–20◦ N, the main development
region (MDR) for Atlantic tropical storms (Goldenberg, et
al., 2001), and the absence of strong vertical wind shear that
would inhibit cyclone formation. In addition, SST and ocean
temperature to a few hundred meters depth along the hurri-
canetrackplayaroleinstormintensity, becausewarmwaters
enhance the potential for the moist convection that fuels the
storm, while cooler waters at depth stirred up by the storm
can dampen its intensity.
Some measures of Atlantic hurricane intensity and dura-
tion increased in recent years, raising concern that global
warming may be a factor in this trend (Bell et al., 2005;
Webster et al., 2005; Emanuel, 2005). However, Gray (2005)
and the director of the United States National Hurricane Cen-
ter (Mayﬁeld, 2005), while acknowledging a connection be-
tween ocean temperature and hurricanes, reject the sugges-
tion that global warming has contributed to the recent storm
upsurge, citing instead natural cycles of Atlantic Ocean tem-
perature. Indeed, multi-decadal variations of Atlantic Ocean
temperatures are found in instrumental data (Kushnir, 1994),
in paleoclimate proxy temperatures (Mann et al., 1998),
and in coupled atmosphere-ocean climate simulations with-
out external forcing (Delworth and Mann, 2000). How-
ever, Mann and Emanuel (2006) argue that the attribution
of observed SST ﬂuctuations in the MDR associated with
the Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation is a statistical arti-
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fact, and that practically all SST variability in the region can
be attributed to competing trends in greenhouse gases and
aerosols.
Climate forcings also contribute to ocean temperature
change, so it is of interest to compare modeled temperature
change due to forcings with observed temperature change
in regions and seasons relevant to tropical storms. Bell et
al. (2005) deﬁne an Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE)
index that accounts for the combined strength and duration
of tropical storms of hurricanes originating in the Atlantic
Ocean. This index (Fig. 4.5 of Bell et al., 2005) was gen-
erally low during 1970–1994. For the past decade the ACE
index has been a factor 2.4 higher than in 1970–1994. Per-
haps not coincidentally, the index had peaks near 1980 and
1990, when global temperature also had peaks, and the index
was low during the few years affected by the 1991 Pinatubo
global cooling. The past decade, when ACE is highest, is the
warmest time in the past century and a period with rapid up-
take of heat by the ocean (Levitus et al., 2005; Willis et al.,
2004; Hansen et al., 2005b; Lyman et al., 2006).
Figure 6a shows SST anomalies in 1995–2005, the time
of high hurricane intensity, relative to 1970–1994, when At-
lantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico hurricanes were weaker.
Observations have warming ∼0.2◦C in the Gulf of Mexico
and ∼0.45◦C in the MDR. The ensemble mean of the simu-
lation with standard “all forcings” has warming about 0.35◦C
in both regions, suggesting that much, perhaps most, of ob-
served warming in these critical regions is due to the forcings
that drive the climate model. Increasing GHGs, the princi-
pal forcing driving the model toward warming (Fig. 1), are
known accurately, but other forcings have large uncertainties.
Thus we performed additional simulations in which the most
uncertain forcings were altered to test the effect of uncer-
tainties and to provide more fodder for examining statistical
signiﬁcance.
The lower three rows in Figs. 6a (and 6c) show results for
three 5-member ensembles of model runs with altered tro-
pospheric aerosol and solar forcings, as described in detail
by Hansen et al. (2007a). In AltAer1 anthropogenic sulfate
aerosols have the identical time dependence as in the stan-
dard experiment (Fig. 1) but the anthropogenic increase is
reduced by 50%. AltAer2 adds to AltAer1 a doubling of
the temporal increase of biomass burning aerosols. AltSol
replaces the solar irradiance history of Lean (2000), which
includes both long-term and solar cycle variations, with the
time series of Lean et al. (2002), which retains only the solar
change due to the 11-year Schwabe cycle. These alternative
forcings all yield ensemble-mean SST warmings in the MDR
comparable to that with standard forcings.
Figure 6b shows the 1995–2005 temperature anomalies in
the ﬁve individual runs with “all forcings”, each of which
yields warming in both the Gulf of Mexico and the MDR.
Figure 6c shows the standard deviations σ* among succes-
sive 10-year periods relative to the preceding 25 years within
the available relevant period of record (1900–1994). As ex-
pected, the model has too little variability at low latitudes,
but it is more realistic at middle and high latitudes (the small
“observed” SST variability at the highest latitudes is an artiﬁ-
cial result of specifying a ﬁxed SST if any sea ice is present).
σ* is ∼0.15◦C in the Gulf of Mexico in observations and
model. Observed σ* is ∼0.25◦C in the MDR, but only about
half that large in the model.
In summary, the warming in the model in recent decades
is due to the assumed forcings, and Hansen et al. (2007a)
present evidence that the magnitude of the model’s response
to forcings is realistic on time scales from that for individual
volcanic eruptions to multidecadal GHG increases. The pe-
riod 1970–2005 under discussion with regard to hurricanes is
the time when forcings are known most accurately, and dur-
ing that period anthropogenic GHGs were the dominant forc-
ing. Although unforced ﬂuctuations undoubtedly contribute
to Atlantic Ocean temperature change, the expected GHG
warming is comparable in magnitude to observed warming
and must be at least a signiﬁcant contributor to that warm-
ing.
We conclude that the deﬁnitive assertion of Gray (2005)
and Mayﬁeld (2005), that human-made GHGs play no role
in the Atlantic Ocean temperature changes that they assume
to drive hurricane intensiﬁcation, is untenable. Speciﬁcally,
the assertions that (1) hurricane intensiﬁcation of the past
decade is due to changes in SST in the Atlantic Ocean, and
(2) global warming cannot have had a signiﬁcant role in the
hurricane intensiﬁcation of the past decade, are mutually in-
consistent. On the contrary, although natural cycles play a
role in changing Atlantic SST, our model results indicate
that, to the degree that hurricane intensiﬁcation of the past
decade is a product of increasing SST in the Atlantic Ocean
and the Gulf of Mexico, human-made GHGs probably are
a substantial contributor, as also concluded by Mann and
Emanuel (2006). Santer et al. (2006) have obtained similar
conclusions by examining the results of 22 climate models.
Figure 6d shows the additional SST warming during hur-
ricane season by mid-century in the three IPCC, alterna-
tive, and 2◦C scenarios, relative to the present. SST is only
one of the environmental factors that affect hurricanes, but
there is theoretical (Emanuel, 1987) and empirical evidence
(Emanuel, 2005; Webster et al., 2005) that higher SST con-
tributes to increased maximum strength of tropical cyclones.
The salient point that we note in Fig. 6d is that, despite the
fact that warming “in the pipeline” in 2004 is the same for all
scenarios, the alternative scenario already at mid-century has
notably less warming than the other scenarios. This result
refutes the common statement that constraining climate forc-
ingshasanegligibleeffectonexpectedwarmingthiscentury.
Divergence of warming among the scenarios is even greater
in later decades, as the growth of climate forcing declines
rapidly in the alternative scenario, thus making that scenario
less “dangerous” to the extent that SST inﬂuences storm in-
tensity.
www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2287/2007/ Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 2287–2312, 20072298 J. Hansen et al.: Dangerous human-made interference with climate
Fig. 6. (a) 1995–2005 August–October SST anomalies relative to 1970–1994 base period, the top map for observations and next four for
several “all forcing” ensembles, (b) 1995–2005 August–October SST anomalies relative to 1970–1994 for individual ensemble members of
the standard “all forcings” simulation, (c)standard deviations among successive decadal means relative to immediately preceding 25 years,
(d) simulated 2045–2055 August–October SST anomalies relative to the present (2001–2009 mean).
4.2.3 Ice sheet and methane hydrate stabilities
Perhaps the greatest threat of catastrophic climate impacts
for humans is the possibility that warming may cause one or
moreoftheicesheetstobecomeunstable, initiatingaprocess
of disintegration that is out of humanity’s control. We focus
on ice sheet stability, because of the potential for sea level to
change this century. However, ice sheet stability is related to
the stability of methane hydrates in permafrost and in marine
sediments, because ice sheet disintegration and methane re-
lease are both affected by surface warming at high latitudes
and by ocean warming at depths that affect ice shelves and
shallow methane hydrate deposits. Also, a substantial pos-
itive climate feedback from methane release could make it
difﬁcult to achieve the relatively benign alternative scenario,
thus affecting the ice sheet stability issue as well as other cli-
mate impacts. Most methane hydrates in marine sediments
are at depths beneath the ocean ﬂoor that would require cen-
turies for destabilization (Kvenvolden and Lorenson, 2001;
Archer, 2007), but the anthropogenic thermal burst in ocean
temperatures is likely to persist for centuries. Furthermore,
the methane in shallow sediments, i.e. at or near the sea ﬂoor,
might begin to yield a positive climate feedback this century
if substantial warm thermal anomalies penetrate to the ocean
bottom.
The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets contain enough
water to raise sea level about 70m, with Greenland and West
Antarctica each containing about 10% of the total and East
Antarctica holding the remaining 80%. IPCC (2001) central
estimatesforsealevelchangeinthe21stcenturyincludeneg-
ligible contributions from Greenland and Antarctica, as they
presume that melting of ice sheet fringes will be largely bal-
anced by ice sheet growth in interior regions where snowfall
increases.
However, Earth’s history shows that the long-term re-
sponse to global warming includes substantial melting of
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ice and sea level rise. During the penultimate interglacial
period, ∼130000 years ago, when global temperature may
have been as much as ∼1◦C warmer than in the present inter-
glacial period, sea level was 4±2m higher than today (Mc-
Culloch and Esat, 2000; Thompson and Goldstein, 2005),
demonstrating that today’s sea level is not particularly fa-
vored. However, changes of sea level and global temperature
among recent interglacial periods are not large compared to
the uncertainties, and ice sheet stability is affected not only
by global temperature but also by the geographical and sea-
son distribution of solar irradiance, which differ from one in-
terglacialperiodtoanother. Therefore, itisdifﬁculttousethe
last interglacial period as a measure of the sensitivity of sea
level to global temperature. The most recent time with global
temperature ∼3◦C greater than today (during the Pliocene,
∼3 million years ago) had sea level 25±10m higher than to-
day (Barrett et al., 1992; Dowsett et al. 1994; Dwyer et al.,
1995), suggesting that, given enough time, a BAU level of
global warming could yield huge sea level change. A prin-
cipal issue is thus the response time of ice sheets to global
warming.
It is commonly assumed, perhaps because of the time scale
of the ice ages, that the response time of ice sheets is millen-
nia. Indeed, ice sheet models designed to interpret slow pa-
leoclimate changes respond lethargically, i.e. on millennial
time scales. However, perceived paleoclimate change may
reﬂect more the time scale for changes of forcing, rather than
an inherent ice sheet response time. Ice sheet models used
for paleoclimate studies generally do not incorporate all the
physics that may be critical for the wet process of ice sheet
disintegration, e.g. modeling of the ice streams that chan-
nel ﬂow of continental ice to the ocean, including effects of
melt percolation through crevasses and moulins, removal of
ice shelves by the warming ocean, and dynamical propaga-
tion inland of the thinning and retreat of coastal ice. Hansen
(2005a,b) argues that, for a forcing as large as that in BAU
climate forcing scenarios, a large ice sheet response would
likely occur within centuries, and ice melt this century could
yield sea level rise of 1m or more and a dynamically chang-
ing ice sheet that is out of our control.
Two regional climate changes particularly relevant to ice
sheet response time are: (1) surface melt on the ice sheets,
and (2) melt of submarine ice shelves that buttress glaciers
draining the ice sheets. Zwally et al. (2002) showed that
increased surface melt on Greenland penetrated ice sheet
crevasses and reached the ice sheet base, where it lubri-
cated the ice-bedrock interface and accelerated ice discharge
to the ocean. Van den Broeke (2005) found that unusu-
ally large surface melt on an Antarctic ice shelf preceded
and probably contributed signiﬁcantly to collapse of the ice
shelf. Thinning and retreat of ice shelves due to warming
ocean water works in concert with surface melt. Hughes
(1972, 1981) and Mercer (1978) suggested that ﬂoating and
grounded ice shelves extending into the ocean serve to but-
tress outlet glaciers, and thus a warming ocean that melts
ice shelves could lead to rapid ice sheet shrinkage or col-
lapse. Conﬁrmation of the effectiveness of these processes
has been obtained in the past decade from observations of
increased surface melt, ice shelf thinning and retreat, and ac-
celeration of glaciers on the Antarctic Peninsula (De Ange-
lis and Skvarca, 2003; Rignot et al., 2004; van den Broeke,
2005), West Antarctica (Rignot, 1998; Shepherd et al., 2002,
2004; Thomas et al., 2004), and Greenland (Abdalati et al.,
2001; Zwally et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2003), in some
cases with documented effects extending far inland. Thus
we examine here both projected surface warming on the ice
sheets and warming of nearby ocean waters.
Summer surface air temperature change on Greenland in
the 21st century is only 0.5–1◦C with alternative scenario cli-
mate forcings (Fig. 4), but it is 2–4◦C for the IPCC BAU sce-
narios (A2 and A1B). Simulated 21st century summer warm-
ings in West Antarctica (Fig. 4) differ by a similar factor, be-
ing ∼0.5◦C in the alternative scenario and ∼2◦C in the BAU
scenarios.
Submarine ice shelves around Antarctica and Greenland
extend to ocean depths of 1km and deeper (Rignot and Ja-
cobs, 2002). Figure 7b shows simulated zonal mean ocean
temperature change versus depth for the past century and the
21st century. Despite near absence of surface warming in the
Antarctic Circumpolar Current, warming of a few tenths of
a degree is found at depths from a few hundred to 1500m,
consistent with observations in the past half-century (Gille,
2002; Aoki et al., 2003). Modeled warming is due to GHGs,
with less warming when all forcings are included.
Maps of simulated temperature change for the top 1360m
of the ocean (Fig. 7a) show warming around the entire cir-
cumference of Greenland, despite cooling in the North At-
lantic. This warming at ocean depth differs by about a fac-
tor of two between the alternative and BAU scenarios, less
than the factor ∼4 difference in summer surface warming
over Greenland and Antarctica, consistent with the longer re-
sponse time of the ocean. Although we cannot easily convert
temperature increase into rate of melting and sea level rise, it
is apparent that the BAU scenarios pose much greater risk of
large sea level rise than the alternative scenario, as discussed
in Sect. 6.
Surface and submarine temperature change are also rele-
vant to the stability of methane hydrates in permafrost and
in ocean sediments. Recent warming is already beginning to
cause release of methane from thawing permafrost in Siberia
(Walter et al., 2006; Zimov et al., 2006), with similar en-
hancements due to permafrost and vegetation changes in
Scandinavia (Christensen et al., 2004), but this methane re-
lease is not yet large enough to yield an overall increase of
atmosphericCH4, asshowninSect.5. Projected21stcentury
summer warming in the Northern Hemisphere permafrost re-
gions is typically a factor of ﬁve larger in BAU scenarios than
in the alternative scenario (Fig. 4), suggesting that the threat
of a signiﬁcant positive climate feedback is much greater in
the BAU scenarios.
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Fig. 7. (a) Temperature change in the top 10 layers (1360m) of the ocean for three periods and three forcings, (b) zonal-mean ocean
temperature change for these forcings. Positive and negative temperature intervals are symmetric about zero.
Methane hydrates in ocean sediments are an even larger
potential source of methane emissions (Archer, 2007). It is
possible that much of the temperature rise in extreme global
warming events, such as the approximately 6◦C that occurred
at the Paleocene-Eocene boundary about 55 million years
ago (Bowen et al., 2006), resulted from catastrophic release
of methane from methane hydrates in ocean sediments. It
may require many centuries for ocean warming to substan-
tially impact these methane hydrates (Archer, 2007). Cal-
culations of global warming enhancement from methane hy-
drates based on diffusive or upwelling-diffusion ocean mod-
els suggest that the methane hydrate feedback is small on
the century time scale (Harvey and Huang, 1995). How-
ever, the positive thermal anomalies that we simulate with
our dynamic ocean model at great ocean depths at high lati-
tudes (Fig. 7) are much larger near the ocean bottom than we
would obtain with diffusive mixing of anomalies (as in our
Q-ﬂux model), suggesting that further attention to the pos-
sibility of methane hydrate release is warranted. With our
present lack of understanding, we can perhaps only say with
reasonable conﬁdence that the chance of signiﬁcant methane
hydrate feedback is greater with BAU scenarios than with the
alternative scenario, and that empirical evidence from prior
interglacial periods suggests that large methane hydrate re-
lease is unlikely if global warming is kept within the range
of recent interglacial periods.
5 Actual GHG trends versus scenarios
Global and regional climate changes simulated for IPCC sce-
narios in the 21st century are large in comparison with ob-
served climate variations in the 20th century. This raises the
question: is it plausible for global climate forcing to follow a
path with a smaller forcing than those in the IPCC scenarios?
5.1 Ambient GHG amounts
Figure 8a compares GHG scenarios and observations, the lat-
ter being an update of Hansen and Sato (2004) (see http:
//data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/ghgases/), who deﬁne the
data sources and methods of obtaining global means from
station measurements. Figure 8b shows the corresponding
annual growth rates. Figures 8c and d compare observed cli-
mate forcings and their growth rates with the IPCC, 2◦C, and
alternative scenarios.
Observed CO2 falls close to all scenarios, which do not
differ much in early years of the 21st century. CO2 has large
year-to-year variations in its growth rate due to variations in
terrestrial and ocean sinks, as well as biomass burning and
fossil fuel sources. However, we are able to draw conclu-
sions in Sect. 5.3 about the realism of CO2 scenarios by com-
paring emission scenarios with real world data on fossil fuel
CO2 emission trends, for which there are reasonably accurate
data.
Overall, growth rates of the well-mixed non-CO2 forcings
fall below IPCC scenarios (Figs. 8a, b). Growth of CH4
falls below any IPCC scenario and even below the alterna-
tive scenario. Observed N2O falls slightly below all scenar-
ios. The sum of MPTGs (Montreal Protocol Trace Gases)
and OTGs (Other Trace Gases) falls between the IPCC sce-
narios and the alternative scenario (which was deﬁned at a
later time than the IPCC scenarios, when more observational
data were available). The estimated forcing by MPTGs is
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Fig. 8. (a) Greenhouse gas amounts, (b) growth rates, and (c) resulting forcings and (d) forcing growth rates for IPCC (2001), “alternative”,
and “2◦C” scenarios (Hansen et al., 2000; Hansen and Sato, 2004). Observations in (d) are 5-year running means of data described by
Hansen and Sato (2004) and in the text. Data for recent decades are those reported by the NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory, Global
Monitoring Division (http://www.cmdl.noaa.gov/). MPTGs and OTGs without available observations (4.9% of the MPTG + OTG estimated
forcing in 2000) were assumed to follow IPCC scenario A1B, which probably exaggerates their forcing, as all measured MPTGs and OTGs
are currently falling below their IPCC scenarios.
based on measurements of 10 of these gases, as delineated
by Hansen and Sato (2004), all of which are growing more
slowly than in the IPCC scenarios, with the few signiﬁcant
unmeasured MPTGs assumed to follow the lowest IPCC sce-
nario. OTGs with reported data include HFC-134a and SF6,
for which measurements are close to or slightly below IPCC
scenarios.
Figures 8c and d show that the net forcing by well-mixed
GHGs for the past few years has been following a course
close to that of the alternative scenario. However, it should
not be assumed that forcings will remain close to the alter-
native scenario, because, as shown below, fossil fuel CO2
emissions now substantially exceed those in the alternative
scenario.
The alternative scenario was deﬁned (Hansen et al., 2000)
as a potential goal under the assumption of concerted global
efforts to simultaneously (1) reduce air pollution (for hu-
man health, climate and other reasons), and (2) stabilize CO2
emissions initially and begin to achieve signiﬁcant emission
reductions before mid-century, such that added CO2 forcing
is held to ∼1W/m2 in 50 years and ∼1.5W/m2 in 100 years.
Thus the alternative scenario assumes that CH4 amount will
peak within a decade and then decline enough to balance
continued growth of N2O. It also assumes that the decline
of CH4 and other O3 precursors will decrease tropospheric
O3 enough to balance the small increase in forcing (several
hundredths of a W/m2) expected due to recovery of halogen-
induced stratospheric O3 depletion.
The most demanding requirement of the alternative sce-
nario is that added CO2 forcing be held to ∼1W/m2 in 50
years and ∼1.5W/m2 in 100 years. The scenario in our
present climate simulations, for example, has annual mean
CO2 growth of 1.7ppm/year at the end of the 20th century
declining to 1.3ppm/year by 2050. The plausibility of the
alternative scenario thus depends critically upon fossil fuel
CO2 emissions.
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Fig. 9. (a) Decay of a small pulse of CO2 added to today’s atmosphere, based on analytic approximation to the Bern carbon cycle model (Joos
et al., 1996; Shine et al., 2005), (b) fossil fuel emissions to date based on sources in Fig. 9, and proven reserves and estimated economically
recoverable reserve growth based on EIA (2005) and, in the case of coal, IPCC (2001).
5.2 Fossil fuel CO2 emissions
Global fossil fuel CO2 emissions change by only a few per-
cent per year and are known with sufﬁcient accuracy that
we can draw conclusions related to atmospheric CO2 trends,
despite large year-to-year variability in atmospheric CO2
growth. In recent decades the increase of atmospheric CO2,
averaged over several years, has been ∼58% of fossil fuel
emissions (IPCC, 2001; Hansen, 2005b). Carbon cycle mod-
els suggest that this “airborne fraction” of CO2 is unlikely
to decrease this century if emissions increase, indeed, most
models yield an increasing airborne fraction as terrestrial
CO2 uptake is likely to decrease (Cox et al., 2000; Friedling-
stein, et al., 2003; Fung et al., 2005; Matthews et al., 2005;
Jones et al., 2005).
Carbon cycle facts sketched in Fig. 9 aid discussion of the
role of fossil fuel CO2 emissions in determining future cli-
mate forcing, and speciﬁcally help deﬁne constraints on CO2
emissions that are needed if the alternative scenario is to be
achieved. Figure 9a shows the decay of a small pulse CO2
emission based on a simple analytic ﬁt to the Bern carbon
cycle model (Joos et al., 1996)
CO2(%)=18+14e−t/420+18e−t/70+24e−t/21+26e−t/3.4. (1)
In Eq. (1), t is time, and we slightly rounded coefﬁcients
calculated by Joos (Shine et al., 2005).
In this approximation of the carbon cycle, about one-third
of anthropogenic CO2 emissions remain in the atmosphere
after 100 years (Fig. 9a) and one-ﬁfth after 1000 years. Pro-
cesses not accounted for by the model, including burial of
carbon in ocean sediments from perturbation of the CaCO3
cycle and silicate weathering, remove CO2 on longer time
scales (Archer, 2005), but for practical purposes 500–1000
years is “forever”, as it is long enough for ice sheets to re-
spond and it is many human generations. Indeed, Eq. (1)
should be viewed as an approximate lower bound for the
portion of fossil fuel CO2 emissions that remain airborne.
The uptake capacity of the ocean decreases as the amount of
dissolved carbon increases (the buffer factor increases) and
there are uncertain but potentially large climate feedbacks
that may add CO2 to the air, e.g. carbon emissions from for-
est dieback (Cox et al., 2000), melting permafrost (Walter et
al., 2006; Zimov et al., 2006), and warming ocean bottom
(Archer, 2007).
Integration over the period 1750–2005 of the product of
Eq. (1) and fossil fuel emissions yields a present airborne
fossil fuel CO2 amount of ∼80ppm. (Kharecha and Hansen,
2007) The observed atmospheric CO2 increase is ∼100ppm,
the difference presumably due to the net consequence of de-
forestation and biospheric uptake not incorporated in the car-
boncyclemodel, and, inpart, imprecisionofthecarboncycle
model. This calculation provides a check on the reasonable-
ness of the carbon cycle model approximation of Eq. (1),
which should continue to provide useful estimates for the
moderate fossil fuel emissions inherent in the alternative sce-
nario. As mentioned above, for the greater CO2 emissions of
BAU scenarios Eq. (1) may begin to substantially underes-
timate airborne CO2, as it excludes the nonlinearity of the
ocean carbon cycle and anticipated climate feedbacks on at-
mospheric CO2 and CH4, the latter being eventually oxidized
to CO2.
Figure 9b suggests the key role that coal and unconven-
tional fossil fuels (labeled “other”) will play in determining
future CO2 levels and the attainment or non-attainment of
the alternative scenario. If growth of oil and gas reserves
estimated by the Energy Information Administration (EIA,
2005) is realistic, full exploitation of oil and gas will take air-
borne atmospheric CO2 to ∼450ppm, assuming that coal use
is phased out over the next several decades except for uses
where the CO2 produced can be captured and sequestered.
(Kharecha and Hansen, 2007) Achievement of this CO2 limit
alsorequiresthatthemassiveamountsofunconventionalfos-
sil fuels (labeled “other” in Fig. 9) are exploited only if the
resulting CO2 is captured and sequestered.
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For historical fossil fuel CO2 emissions we use the data set
of Marland et al. (2006) supplemented with data for 2004–
2005 from British Petroleum (2006). The data are imper-
fect, e.g. the temporary reduction of coal use in China in the
late 1990s may have been exaggerated by reporting problems
(Sinton, 2001), but effort has been made to make the data
as temporally consistent as possible (Marland et al., 2006).
We include estimates for CO2 from gas ﬂaring (0.3% of
CO2 emissions) and cement production (3.8% of emissions
in 2005). We normalize British Petroleum (2006) data for
each fossil fuel such that it coincides with the ﬁnal year of
Marland et al. (2006) data (2003 in present analysis).
Global fossil fuel CO2 emissions grew at >4%/year for
most of the century preceding 1973, but since 1973 at
∼1.7%/year and for the past decade at ∼2%/year. Coal has
produced 50% of fossil fuel CO2 emissions through 2005
(oil 37%, gas 13%), and, with the recent uptick in its use
(Fig. 10a), coal seems poised to retake from oil the role
of the largest current CO2 source, calling into question the
inevitability of continued decarbonization of global energy
(Ausubel, 1996, 2000), at least in the near-term. The white
area in Fig. 10b is the sum of CO2from cement manufacture
and gas ﬂaring in fossil fuel mining.
Continued growth of CO2 emissions at 1.7%/year doubles
emissions in ∼40 years and is close to IPCC BAU growth.
IPCC scenarios B1, A1B, A2 and A1F1 require 50-year con-
stant growth rates of 1.1%, 1.7%, 1.8% and 2.4%, respec-
tively, to reach their 2050 emission rates.
Cumulative CO2 emissions, shown in Fig. 10c by source
region, largely determine the contribution to climate change
at a given date, as summarized by the pie charts (Figs. 10d, e,
f). Current (2005) fossil fuel emissions (Fig. 9d) from China
nearly equal those from the United States, but the cumula-
tive emissions (Fig. 10e) by the United States are more than
three times those of any other country. The contribution of
fossil fuel emissions to global temperature change can be es-
timated by integrating from 1750 to the present the product
of emissions, the portion of emissions remaining airborne at
timet, andtheglobalclimateresponsefunctionfortheperiod
from time t to the present. The climate response function is
given by Fig. 7b of Hansen et al. [2007b] and the airborne
fraction of emissions as a function of time since the emission
is given by a carbon cycle pulse response function (Fig. 9a).
Figure 10f shows that the resulting fractional contributions
to global warming are very similar to the fractional contribu-
tions to cumulative emissions.
Figures 10c and f show that Europe and the United States
(plus Canada and Australia, which have per capita emissions
comparable to the United States, Fig. 10g) each contribute
more than 30 percent to cumulative emissions and global
warming. Much of the ship and air emissions also origi-
nate from these developed countries and some of the emis-
sions within developing countries is from companies that are
owned by developed countries. Thus, despite expected as-
cendancy of emissions from developing country, the devel-
oped countries will remain primarily responsible for global
warming for at least the next several decades. These facts
have given rise to the concept that developed and developing
countries must share a common but differentiated responsi-
bility to address global warming.
The rationale for the alternative scenario is that a leveling
of CO2 emissions is practical in the near term based on ex-
isting technologies, especially via improved energy efﬁcien-
cies, and that reduced long-term emissions could be achieved
via CO2 sequestration, renewable energies, improved nu-
clear power, and/or new non-fossil energy sources. Pacala
and Socolow (2004) provide a quantitative discussion of sev-
eral technologies that together provide sufﬁcient “wedges”
to reduce near-term CO2 emissions growth to 0%. However,
leveling off of global emissions will not occur without con-
certed efforts to adopt required technologies. In view of the
growing proportion of emissions from developing countries,
it will also require international cooperation and sharing of
technologies.
Failure of current emission trends to meet the alternative
scenario can be quantiﬁed using the empirical fact that the
CO2 “airborne fraction” (ratio of observed atmospheric CO2
increase to fossil fuel CO2 emissions), averaged over several
years, has remained ﬁxed at nearly 60% for half a century.
60% of current fossil fuel emissions yields an annual air-
borne CO2 increment of 2ppm, which should thus be viewed
as the present underlying growth rate of atmospheric CO2,
even though actual increases ﬂuctuate strongly from year to
year. The alternative scenario permits CO2 growth of 75ppm
between 2000 and 2050 (85ppm for IPCC estimates of forc-
ing per ppm) to yield a 50-year forcing of 1W/m2, and it
assumes that this might be achieved, for example, via CO2
annual growth decreasing from the late 20th century value of
1.7ppm/year to 1.3 ppm/year by mid-century.
Overshoot of the 1W/m2 target for added CO2 forcing
this half-century can be balanced, in principle, by reduc-
ing non-CO2 forcings. However, the maximum likely de-
crease of non-CO2 forcings is several tenths of 1W/m2, so
continued 2%/year growth of CO2 emissions for even one
more decade may make the alternative scenario impractical
to achieve. The action most threatening to the alternative
scenario would be extensive construction of new coal-ﬁred
power plants without provision for CO2 sequestration, be-
cause of the long life of power plant infrastructure. Climatic
consequences of coal-ﬁred power plants can be averted via
coal gasiﬁcation with CO2 sequestration (Hawkins, 2005),
but during the next 10 years that technology is only being
tested. Thus the alternative scenario’s near-term requirement
of stabilizing CO2 emissions requires emphasis on greater
use of renewable energy sources and, especially, energy efﬁ-
ciency, which together have the potential to satisfy increased
energy needs for at least 1–2 decades (Romm et al., 1998;
Pacala and Socolow, 2004; NCEP, 2004).
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6 Summary: can we avoid dangerous climate change?
6.1 Global warming: how much is dangerous?
IPCC (2001) provides an invaluable service by assessing
knowledge of climate change and addressing the goal of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Article 2 of United Nations, 1992), which is to stabilize at-
mospheric composition at a level avoiding “dangerous an-
thropogenic interference” with climate. IPCC (2001) dis-
cusses dangerous interference with the aid of a “burning em-
bers” diagram, in which several “reasons for concern” are as-
signed colors that become increasingly red as global temper-
ature increases, the color assignments being based on expert
opinions. The diagram is sometimes taken as suggesting that
global warming of 2–3◦C, relative to recent temperatures, is
likely to be dangerous (IPCC, 2001; Smith and Hitz, 2003;
Yohe et al., 2004). Schneider and Mastrandrea (2005) use the
burning embers for a probabilistic assessment of dangerous,
with 2.85◦C as the 50th percentile threshold.
Hansen (2004, 2005a, b) asserts that the dangerous level
of global warming is closer to 1◦ C or less, his principal ra-
tionale being evidence from the Earth’s history that greater
warmings are likely to cause large sea level change, which,
he argues, will occur on a time scale of centuries. We discuss
the sea level issue in Sect. 6.1.1 and regional climate effects
in 6.1.2, describing additional evidence in support of the con-
tention that a level of global warming as low as 1◦C can have
dangerous effects.
6.1.1 Global temperature and sea level
Simulated 21st century climate change can be used to drive
ice sheet models that calculate the expected contribution of
ice sheets to sea level change. Wild et al. (2003) include ice
sheet calculations within their high-resolution (T-106) global
climate model with a BAU scenario that has CO2 reach-
ing 715ppm in 2100, ﬁnding that both the Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheets grow, contributing a 12cm/century fall
to sea level change. Huybrechts et al. (2004) use a 3-D ther-
momechanical ice sheet/ice shelf model driven by climate
change produced by general circulation models (ECHAM4
and HadAM3H), ﬁnding mass loss from Greenland, larger
mass gain by Antarctica, with little net sea level change by
2100.
We question whether such ice sheet models adequately
represent all physics that is important during the wet pro-
cess of ice sheet disintegration in a warming climate. Ex-
plicit modeling of ice streams that channel ﬂow of ice to the
ocean may be needed, including effects of rainfall and melt
percolation through crevasses and moulins, as well as the re-
moval of ice shelves by the warming ocean and dynamical
propagation inland of effects due to thinning and retreat of
coastal ice. Increased snowfall in ice sheet interiors provides
one negative feedback, but with BAU warming of several de-
grees Celsius over the ice sheets most of Greenland and West
Antarctica would be bathed in summer melt. As the area of
melt increases, as ice shelves are lost, and as coastal ice thins,
positive feedbacks due to decreasing albedo and lowering ice
surface may feed a rapid nonlinear dynamical response.
Given the difﬁculty of modeling ice sheet response to
warming, it is useful to examine the Earth’s history for ev-
idence of ice sheet response to prior warmings. Global tem-
peratureshouldbeameaningfulparameterforsuchempirical
study. It is shown in Efﬁcacy (2005) that there is a congru-
ence in the spatial distribution of climate response to most
global forcing mechanisms normalized by the effective (or
ﬁxed SST) forcing, with exceptions for highly localized forc-
ings such as land-use change or biomass burning aerosols,
and with limitation to comparisons for a ﬁxed distribution of
continents. This approximate equivalence of effective forc-
ings increases the likelihood of a meaningful relationship be-
tween global temperature and climate impacts such as sea
level change.
The highest sea level in the past half million years was at
most ∼+5 m relative to today. A case has been made for
higher sea level ∼400Kybp (Hearty et al., 1999), but there
are dating uncertainties and it is likely that this higher stand
occurred at a much earlier time (Droxler et al., 2002). It is
necessary to go back to the Pliocene, about 3 million years
ago, to ﬁnd sea levels clearly much greater than today. Sea
level then is estimated to have been 25±10m higher than to-
day (Barrett et al., 1992; Dowsett et al., 1994; Dwyer et al.,
1995). Maximum global temperatures during interglacial pe-
riods of the past half million years were probably about +1◦C
relative to today; Antarctic temperatures in some interglacial
periods reached about +2◦C (Petit et al., 1999), but tropi-
cal maxima were <+1◦C (Medina-Elizade and Lea, 2005;
Hansen et al., 2006). The middle Pliocene was about +3◦C
relative to today (Crowley, 1996; Dowsett et al., 1996).
Long-term global ice volume changes tend to lag global
temperature change by a few thousand years (Mudelsee,
2001), but these changes are in response to weak forcings
varying on millennial time scales (Hays et al., 1976). Nev-
ertheless, at some ice age terminations ice volume change is
rapid, e.g. the largest sea level rise following the last ice age,
Meltwater Pulse 1A, when sea level rose about 20m in 400
years, was practically synchronous with the Bolling warming
(Kienastetal., 2003). Otherstudiesprovideevidenceoflarge
(∼10m or more) changes of sea level on “sub-orbital” time
scales (Siddall et al., 2003; Potter et al., 2004; Thompson
and Goldstein, 2005), i.e. sea level changes occurring much
more rapidly than changes of the Earth’s orbital elements.
GHG climate forcings in the IPCC BAU scenarios, such
as A1FI, A2 and A1B, are far outside the range that has ex-
isted on Earth in millions of years. The rate of change of
this sustained forcing exceeds that of known forcings in at
least millions of years. Global warming in the BAU sce-
narios, with canonical climate sensitivity ∼3◦C for doubled
CO2, is ∼3◦C by 2100 and still rising rapidly. By 2100 the
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melt area on Greenland and West Antarctica and the melt
rate of ice shelves, if any ice shelves remain, would be much
greater than today. Thus it is unlikely that the response time
for signiﬁcant ice sheet change could exceed centuries, be-
cause such response times (with sea level change of meters
per century) have occurred during the Pleistocene with much
smaller forcings.
If equilibrium sea level rise is many meters, a re-
sponse time of centuries provides little consolation to coastal
dwellers. They would be faced with intermittent ﬂoods asso-
ciated with storms and continually rebuilding above a tran-
sient sea level. Thus we suggest that sea level change may
deﬁne a low level for global warming that constitutes dan-
gerous change, due to the large concentration of people and
infrastructure along global coastlines.
Present understanding of ice sheet response to global
warming does not allow sharp deﬁnition of a “dangerous”
level, but BAU scenarios are surely well into the danger-
ous regime. Even global warming of 1◦C conceivably could
produce a long-term sea level rise of several meters (Otto-
Bleisner et al., 2006; Overpeck et al., 2006). However,
climate forcing on the ice sheets is far smaller with global
warming <1◦C than with global warming 2–3◦C, and the re-
sulting slower changes of the ice sheets would allow a better
chance to develop climate mitigation strategies or adapt to
sea level change.
6.1.2 Regional climate effects
Regional climate change also yields a clear distinction be-
tween BAU scenarios with global warming ∼3◦C and an al-
ternative scenario that keeps global warming <∼1◦C. In the
speciﬁc alternative scenario we have deﬁned, global warm-
ing is 0.80◦C in the 21st century for a model with climate
sensitivity 2.9◦C for doubled CO2. The resulting change of
local seasonal mean temperature this century is typically 1–
2σ, where σ is the standard deviation of seasonal tempera-
ture in the 20th century. In IPCC BAU scenarios, the average
change of seasonal mean temperature is 5–10σ.
Ecosystems, wildlife, and humans thus wouldbe subjected
in the BAU scenarios to conditions far outside their local
range of experience. Perhaps humans, aided by modern tech-
nology, may adapt readily to such regional climate change.
Wildlife and ecosystems, however, will not have that advan-
tage, and their abilities to migrate may be limited by anthro-
pogenic and geographic constraints on their locations. We
suggestthat5–10σ changesofregionalseasonaltemperature
are prima facie evidence that the BAU scenarios extend well
into the range of “dangerous anthropogenic interference”.
We have focused on temperature change, but hydrologic
changes that accompany global warming may have large ef-
fects on ecosystems, wildlife, and humans. An expansion
and intensiﬁcation of subtropical dry conditions occurs con-
sistently with global warming in our climate simulations
(Hansen et al., 2005a, 2007a). Held and Soden (2006) and
Lu et al. (2007) ﬁnd agreement among a large number of
models in intensiﬁcation of the pattern of precipitation minus
evaporation and its temporal variance, with poleward expan-
sion of subtropical conditions accompanying global warm-
ing. Practical impacts may include increased drought and
ﬁres in regions such as the Western United States, Mediter-
ranean, Australia and parts of Africa. Paleoclimate data
(Cook et al., 2004) provide evidence of strong drought in the
western United States accompanying global warming, and
the GISS model is able to reproduce this tendency for sub-
tropical drying in past warm climates as well as in modern
ones (Shindell et al, 2006). We cannot specify a threshold for
theseeffects, andthereisalreadyevidenceofsuchtendencies
in the past decade. However, the simulated effects are pro-
portional to global warming (Held and Soden, 2006; Lu et
al., 2007), so end-of-century effects under BAU warming are
about three times greater than in the alternative scenario.
Arctic climate change provides another possible criterion
for DAI. The strong positive feedback between sea ice area
and surface albedo makes the Arctic one of the most sensitive
regions on Earth to global warming. In the middle Pliocene,
with global temperature 2–3◦C warmer than today, the Arctic
was ice-free in the warm season. Such drastic climate change
would have deleterious effects on wildlife and indigenous
people (ACIA, 2004), constituting what many people would
agree is dangerous anthropogenic interference with nature.
Thus, from the perspective of the Arctic, IPCC BAU sce-
narios again yield dangerous climate change. We reiterate
that these BAU scenarios did not include variations in short-
lived species, which could further enhance the warming as
substantial reductions in reﬂective aerosols are assumed un-
der SRES scenarios for the late 21st century. However,
warming and positive feedbacks that feed further warming
can be minimized by keeping the net forcing small. We
suggest that, if additional CO2 growth is kept small, as in
the alternative scenario, and if some of the positive non-
CO2 climate forcings that are most effective in the Arctic
are reduced, it may be possible to limit or even eliminate
further Arctic warming. This would require large reductions
of CH4, tropospheric O3, and other pollutants, but such re-
ductions would have ancillary beneﬁts (West et al., 2006;
Air Pollution Workshop, http://www.giss.nasa.gov/meetings/
pollution2005/).
6.1.3 Climate feedbacks
The climate sensitivity of 3/4
◦C per W/m2 (about 3◦C for
doubled CO2) is inferred for the case in which GHGs and
ice sheet area are treated as forcings (Hansen, 2005b). If
climate change is small enough, say in the range of the in-
terglacial periods of the past million years, the areas of the
Greenland and Antarctica ice sheets should not change sig-
niﬁcantly, andthepositivefeedbackofincreasingGHGswith
increasing global temperature is small (+18ppm CO2 per ◦C,
+49 ppb CH4 per ◦C, +15 ppb N2O per ◦C, Hansen and Sato,
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2004). However, with BAU scenarios the expected global
warming extends far outside the range of recent interglacial
periods, raising the possibility of much larger feedbacks such
as destabilization of methane hydrates (Sect. 4.2.3).
Although we lack sufﬁcient information for quantita-
tive analysis, the existence of climate feedbacks appears to
present the possibility of a dichotomy between climate fu-
tures such as the alternative scenario, which keeps global
warming less than 1◦C, and BAU scenarios. If the warm-
ing is less than 1◦C, it appears that strong positive feedbacks
are not unleashed, judging from recent Earth history. On the
other hand, if global warming gets well out of this range,
there is a possibility that positive feedbacks could set in mo-
tion climate changes far outside the range of recent experi-
ence. The ability of the ocean to absorb human-made CO2
decreases as the emissions increase (Archer, 2005), there is
a possibility that the terrestrial biosphere could even become
a source of CO2 (Cox et al., 2000; Jones et al., 2006), and
even a potential that large amounts of methane could be re-
leasedfromunderseamethanehydrates, orfromthawingper-
mafrost, as discussed in Sect. 4.2.3.
6.2 Can we avoid dangerous climate change?
The objective of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (United Nations, 1992) is stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations at a level avoiding dangerous human-
made interference with climate. The obvious question, what
is the “dangerous” greenhouse gas level, has received little
research attention, perhaps because of inherent arbitrariness
in any criteria for “dangerous”.
Actions to address climate change are the prerogative
of the public and their representatives. Science, however,
should provide as much relevant quantitative information as
practical, and unavoidably there is some overlap of the sci-
ence and policy areas. For the sake of clarity of communi-
cation, we include here opinions relating to policy options,
based on quantitative climate science, but these must be rec-
ognized as personal opinions not institutional positions.
We examine potential criteria for dangerous climate
change assuming that humanity wants to preserve planetary
conditions similar to those in the period of civilization, thus
near the range of climate in the present interglacial period,
the Holocene, which has existed almost 12000 years. Even
with such an assumption, various uncertainties make deﬁ-
nition of the dangerous level imprecise and imply that esti-
mates must be continually reﬁned as knowledge improves.
Nevertheless, we can conclude that the world is already
close to the dangerous level. The sharpest criterion is prob-
ably maintenance of long-term sea level close to the present
level, as about one billion people live within 25m elevation
of today’s sea level. Uncertainty exists about the time for ice
sheets to respond to climate change (IPCC, 2001; Hansen,
2005a), but analyses in this paper and comparison with at-
mospheric composition in prior warm periods (Hansen et al.,
2007b) suggest that a CO2 level exceeding ∼450ppm is al-
most surely dangerous, and the ceiling may be even lower.
Reduction of non-CO2 forcings provides some ﬂexibility in
the CO2 ceiling.
6.2.1 The imprecise “dangerous” level
Global warming in “business-as-usual” (BAU) climate forc-
ing scenarios, for climate sensitivity consistent with paleo-
climate data, is at least 2–3◦C by 2100 (relative to 2000) and
still increasing rapidly. Implications include an ice-free Arc-
tic in the warm season, other regional climate changes out-
side the range of historical experience, and initiation of ice
sheet changes that presage future sea level change out of hu-
manity’s control. The Earth, in a broad sense, would be a
different planet than the one that existed for the past 10 mil-
lennia.
Have we already passed a “tipping point” such that it is
now impossible to avoid “dangerous” climate change (Love-
lock, 2006)? In our estimation, we must be close to such a
point, but we may not have passed it yet. It is still feasible to
achieve a scenario that keeps additional global warming un-
der 1◦C, yielding a degree of climate change that is quantita-
tively and qualitatively different than under BAU scenarios.
The “alternative” scenario, designed to keep warming less
than 1◦C, has a signiﬁcantly smaller forcing than any of
the IPCC scenarios. In recent years net growth of all real
world greenhouse gases has run just slightly ahead of the al-
ternative scenario, with the excess due to continued growth
of CO2 emissions at about 2%/year. CO2 emissions would
need to level out soon and decline before mid-century to
approximate the alternative scenario. Moderate changes of
emissions growth rate have a marked effect after decades, as
shown by comparison to BAU scenarios. Early decreases in
emissions growth are the most effective.
The alternative scenario target, keeping added CO2 to
∼80ppm between 2000 and 2050, may already be imprac-
tical due to the 2%/year growth of CO2 emissions in the past
decade. However, the net greenhouse forcing could still meet
the alternative scenario target via the combination of a still
feasible slowdown and reduction of CO2 emissions together
with aggressive absolute reductions of CH4 and O3 and a
slowdown in the growth of N2O. Reduction of non-CO2 forc-
ings has beneﬁts for human health and agriculture (West et
al., 2005; AirPollutionWorkshop, http://www.giss.nasa.gov/
meetings/pollution2005/), as well as for climate. Reduction
of non-CO2 forcings is especially effective in limiting Arctic
climate change (Sect. 6.2.1 above; Shindell et al., 2006).
Continued rapid growth of CO2 emissions and infrastruc-
ture for another decade may make attainment of the alterna-
tive scenario impractical if not impossible. Because wide-
scale use of power plants with CO2 sequestration is at least
a decade away, near-term emphasis on energy efﬁciency
and renewable energy is needed to minimize construction
of previous-generation pulverized-coal power plants. Such
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Fig. 10. Fossil fuel emissions: (a) annual by fuel type, and (b)cumulative by fuel type, (c) cumulative by source country or region, excluding
ship and air emissions, (d) 2005 emissions by source region, (e)cumulative 1750–2005 emissions, (f) relative contribution of fossil fuels to
global warming in 2005, and (g) per capita emissions of the 15 largest sources in 2003. Data sources: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis
Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory for 1751-2003 and British Petroleum (2006) for 2004–2005. Data for Russia are 60% of USSR for
1850–1991 and Russian Federation thereafter.
power plants are a primary cause of increasing CO2 emis-
sions, and their construction commits the world to high CO2
emissions or high costs of power plant replacement. Poten-
tial energy savings from improved efﬁciency, even in devel-
oped countries, are sufﬁcient to cover increased energy de-
mand for the 1-2 decades needed to develop improved energy
technologies (Romm et al., 1998; Pacala and Socolow, 2004;
NCEP, 2004).
Human-made aerosols cause a net negative climate forc-
ing that we estimate (Fig. 1) as about half the magnitude of
positive greenhouse gas forcing. Thus aerosols have dimin-
ished global warming in what Hansen and Lacis (1990) call
a “Faustian bargain”. As humanity reduces particulate air
pollution in the future, a payment in increased global warm-
ing will come due (Andreae et al., 2005). With appropriate
understanding of the aerosol forcing, however, it may be pos-
sible to minimize warming effects of air pollution reduction.
The direct aerosol forcing can be reduced via emphasis on
reduction of black carbon (soot) aerosols that cause warm-
ing (Hansen et al., 2000; Jacobson, 2001). The aerosol indi-
rect effect is non-linear, with the ﬁrst aerosols added having
greatest effect (Menon et al., 2002). Thus retention of a small
amount of aerosols, perhaps in remote areas, may minimize
warming. Better knowledge of aerosol properties and their
effects is needed for analysis.
A scenario that avoids “dangerous” climate change ap-
pears to be still technically feasible. The fact that the re-
cent trend of global GHG climate forcing remains close to
the “alternative scenario” that we estimate as necessary to
avoid “dangerous” climate change provides some basis for
optimism. In addition, we are entering an era in which the
reality of climate change is becoming increasingly apparent,
and it is clear that the effects of climate change, especially
sea level rise and changes in the hydrological cycle, will be
widespread, affecting both developed and developing coun-
tries.
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Reduction of climate forcing is a global problem, as quan-
tiﬁed in Fig. 9, and thus it presents an unusual challenge to
attain needed international cooperation. For this reason it is
particularly important that the scientiﬁc understanding of cli-
mate change and its implications be transmitted to the public
and policy makers, and the message must be understandable
and believable if it is to help produce the actions needed to
avoid dangerous climate change.
Our conclusion that global temperature is nearing the level
of dangerous climate effects implies that little time remains
to achieve the international cooperation needed to avoid
widespread undesirable consequences. CO2 emissions are
the critical issue, because a substantial fraction of these emis-
sions remain in the atmosphere “forever”, for practical pur-
poses (Fig. 9a). The principal implication is that avoidance
ofdangerousclimatechangerequiresthebulkofcoalandun-
conventional fossil fuel resources to be exploited only under
condition that CO2 emissions are captured and sequestered.
A second inference is that remaining gas and oil resources
must be husbanded, so that their role in critical functions
suchasmobilefuelscanbestretcheduntilacceptablealterna-
tives are available, thus avoiding a need to squeeze such fuels
fromunconventionalandenvironmentallydamagingsources.
The task is to achieve a transition to clean carbon-free en-
ergy sources, which are essential on the long run, without
pushing the climate system beyond a level where disastrous
irreversible effects become inevitable.
6.2.2 Role of scientists in the climate debate
These stark conclusions about the threat posed by global cli-
mate change and implications for fossil fuel use are not yet
appreciated by essential governing bodies, as evidenced by
ongoing plans to build coal-ﬁred power plants without CO2
capture and sequestration. In our view, there is an acute need
for science to inform society about the costs of failure to ad-
dress global warming, because of a fundamental difference
between the threat posed by climate change and most prior
global threats.
In the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and
United States, a crisis could be precipitated only by action of
one of the parties. In contrast, the present threat to the planet
and civilization, with the United States and China now the
principal players (though, as Fig. 10 shows, Europe also has
a large responsibility), requires only inaction in the face of
clear scientiﬁc evidence of the danger.
Thus scientists are faced with difﬁcult choices between
communication of scientiﬁc information to the public and
focus on basic research, as there are inherent compromises
in any speciﬁc balance. Former American Vice President Al
Gore, at a plenary session of the December 2006 meeting
of the American Geophysical Union, challenged earth scien-
tists to become involved in informing the public about global
climate change. The overwhelmingly positive audience reac-
tion to his remarks provides hope that the large gap between
scientiﬁc understanding and public knowledge about climate
change may yet be closed.
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